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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ARNOLD SIEVERTS, JOHN SIEV-
ERTS, ALBERT SIEVERTS, JAMES. )1 
SIEVERTS and ABRAHAM SIEV-
ERTS, JR., a co-partnership doing 
business as INLAND DEVELOP-
~fENT COMPANY, ' Case No. 7889 Plai:::ff• and Appella11tJ, )' 
DONALD M. WHITE and LA VINE 
H. WHITE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs brought into this action ·to obtain specific 
performance of a Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into 
with both of the defendants. The Trial Court failed to 
make Findings on some vital issues of fact and it misapplied 
the law to the facts of the case. Plaintiffs appeal from the order 
denying specific performance. 
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.. 
The Trial Court required plaintiffs' complaint to be some-
what specific. As amended it alleged that on or about June 7, 
1950, defendants, as sellers, entered into a written contract 
with plaintiffs, as buyers, to convey certain real estate in Salt 
Lake County for the sum of $18,000.00 (R. 32). The contract 
provided that $7,000.00 was the down payment, and that the 
balance up to $15,000.00 was to be paid on or before December 
15, 1950, and the balance of $3,000.00 was to be paid oo or 
before June 7, 1951 (R. 2). The complaint alleged that the 
down payment of $7,000.00 was made at the time of the 
execution of the contract, and also alleged that the contract 
provided that defendants would furnish plaintiffs with an 
abstract of title showing marketable title in defendants, and 
that defendants assured plaintiffs that the abstract of title would 
be available for examination prior to the time the balance of 
the purchase price became available (R. 32). The complaint 
then alleged: 
"3 That on or about December 15, 1950, the parties 
orally agreed that the balance of the purchase price 
should be payable in monthly installments of $1,000.00 
or more per month until payment in full of the unpaid 
balance of the purchase price. 
· · 4 That pursuant to said oral agreement the plaintiffs 
paid to defendants the sum of $2,000.00 on January 7, 
1951, the sum of $1,000.00 on February 7, 1951, the 
sum of $1,000.00 on February 7, 1951, the sum of 
$1,000.00 on or about March 7, 1951, the sum of 
$1,000.00 on or about April 7, 1951, and the sum of 
$1,000.00 on or about May 7, 1951 and that defend-
ants accept said payments on said contract of purchase, 
making a total of $13,000.00 paid on the said contract 
of sale and purchase. 
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"5. That defendants failed and neglected to furnish 
to plaintiffs a certified abstract of title or any evidence 
of marketability of title to said real estate, or any 
statement with respect to whether there was an unpaid 
mortgage indebtedness against said real property. 
"6. That on or about August 1, 1951, plaintiffs re-
quested defendants to furnish abstract of title con-
tinued to date for purposes of examination of title and 
to ascertain whether there was any unpaid mortgage 
indebtedness against said real property~ but defendants 
refused to furnish either an abstract of title or any 
other evidence of marketable title, and defendants no-
tified plaintiffs orally that they would not furnish any 
abstract of title until or unless plaintiffs first paid the 
balance of the purchase price. 
"7. That defendants demanded the sum of $5,265.03 
as the unpaid balance on or about August 7, 1951, and 
plaintiffs on said date tendered said sum of money to 
defendants in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
plaintiffs requested defendants to execute a warranty 
deed in accordance with the terms of said contract and 
to furnish evidence of marketable title; but defendants 
refused to accept said sum of money or any other sum · 
of money, and defendants refused to execute a warranty 
deer of to furnish evidence of marketable title. 
"8. That plaintiffs have been willing at all times to 
pay the unpaid balance of the purchase price, whatever 
the unpaid balance might be computed to be, and 
plaintiffs continue to offer to pay the unpaid balance 
of the purchase price." (R. 3·2-33}. 
The complaint then alleged that plaintiffs were entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee of $2500.00, plus $7500.00 
damages and their costs (R. 34). Plaintiffs prayed for specific 
performance, attorneys' fees, costs and damages for failure to 
perform as agreed (R. 34). 
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Defendants denied any oral modification of the contract 
but admitted the payments alleged in Paragraph 4 of the 
complaint. It was denied that "said payments were made pur· 
suant to an oral agreement," and defendants denied the re-
maining allegations of the complaint (R. 35). 
While defendants denied that plaintiffs had made any 
tender, as alleged in their complaint, no suggestion was made 
cit her indirectly or by implication that any such tender was 
insufficient in form or substance or at all. The importance of 
this idea will become increasingly apparent in consideration 
of the facts and law in this case. 
Defendants alleged in their "counterclaim" the making 
of original written contract, and that plaintiffs failed to. per-
form; they alleged that on July 19, 1951, defendants gave 
plaintiffs a written notice that "unless the delinquent payments 
are made, together with interest due thereon, within twenty 
(20) days from the date thereof, said contract would be can-
celled. * * *'' 
·'That plaintiffs failed, neglected, and refused to 'perform 
in accordance with said contract and in accordance with said 
written notice of delinquency." 
Defendants then pleaded the giving of a five-day notice 
to quit the premises on August 13•, 1951, plaintiffs' failure 
to respond to such notice, unlawful detention by plaintiffs and 
damages. 
Plaintiffs replied, admitting that Abraham Sieverts, Jr.. 
received a letter on July 21, 1951, which declared that plain-
tiffs were d~linquent, admitting service of a letter on August 
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15, 1951, being notice to quit, at the home of Abraham Sieverts, 
Jr., denying service of the notice to quit and premises, and 
denying unlawful detainer. Plaintiffs alleged further: 
"7. Further replying to Paragraph 5 of the counter-
claim, plaintiffs allege that defendants declared that 
the amount necessary to pay said purchase price in full 
on August 7, 1951, was the sum of $5,265.03 and 
plaintiffs tendered said amount to defendants and de-
manded that defendants execute and deliver a deed 
of conveyance, and defendants promised to meet with 
plaintiffs for said purpose on August 7, 1951, but failed 
and neglected to do so; and that defendants willfully 
avoided payment of the alleged unpaid balance of the 
purchase price, and they are estopped to claim default 
on the part of plaintiffs. 
"8. Further replying to said paragraph 5 of the 
counterclaim, the plaintiffs allege that they relied on 
the representations of defendants as to the exact amount 
of the unpaid balance of the purchase price, by reason 
of the fact that defendants had failed to rurnish plain-
tiffs with a certified abseract of title or other evidence 
of title from which plaintiffs could definitely ascertain 
whether or not there were any delinquent taxes or 
other charges against the contract balance; and that 
defendants having told the plaintiffs that the sum of 
$5,265.03 constituted the balance of principal and in-
terest and plaintiffs having tendered said sum, and 
defendants never having made any correction of said 
representation, defendants were and are estopped to 
assert that the tender maed by plaintiffs was insuffi-
cient or that plaintiffs failed to tender the balance 
timely. 
"9. Plaintiffs deny each and every allegation of para-
graph 6 of said counterclaim; and they allege that any 
notice attempted to be given on or about August 13, 
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1951, was wrongful and wit ha design to defraud 
plaintiffs of their interest in said real estate.·' (R. 
39-40). 
This, then, was the status of the pleadings when the parties 
\vent to trial. 
At the trial all sides agreed upon the making of the 
0riginal written contract. Mr. McKay M. Loveland, real estate 
agent who handled the transactions for plaintiffs, testified 
that the only abstract of title ever offered plaintiffs by de· 
fendants in connection with this transaction, "Exhibit G," was 
in his possession only over night, and that it was not examined 
with respect to the condition of the title (R. 47-48). It was 
not examined at that time because Mrs. White told Mr. Love-
land and Mr. Sieverts that "she owed someone that she bought 
one piece of property from, owed the money to them on a real 
estate contract, and that she would pay off (R. 48). This is 
consistent with the testimony of Sieverts (R. 17}, and it is 
not denied either by Mr. or Mrs. White or any other witness 
(R. 136, 164). 
This abstract does not cover all the property described in 
the written real estate contract but is a triangle approximately 
88 feet by 105 feet. (See Ex. F., Ex. G). There is some con· 
fusion in the testimony with respect to whether there was to 
be a title insurance policy or an abstract to the triangle. Plain· 
tiffs' evidence showed that Mrs. White had ordered a pre· 
liminary report from Security Title Company on this piece of 
property on May 26, 1950, but no policy was ever issued by 
that company on the property. There is no evidence as to 
whether the property is insurable or what the status of the 
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title is to it. All sides agree that the triange is an impurtant 
tract insofar as the use of the balance of the property is con· 
cerned. Questioned about the triangle Mrs. White stated that 
she had abstracts on all her properties, but Ex. G, which does 
not cover all the property described in the contract, was the 
only abstract ever delivered to plaintiffs for any purpose (R. 
17~ 174). And no title insurance policy on the triangle was 
ever tendered to plaintiffs by defendants. 
There is general agreement that in the first part of Janu-
ary, 1951, a conversation occurred with respect to the modi-
fication of the written contract. The version of Abraham Siev-
erts, Jr., was that he told lvir. and Mrs. White that they would 
have to make different arrangements, and they stated at first 
that they could not or did not want to and that there was fur-
ther discussion to the effect that plaintiffs had $2000.00 
available at that time. Abraham Sieverts gave them a check 
as they left the office and "I told Don and Lavine White if 
they were not" (satisfied), "then do not cash the check, and 
we will have to make other arrangements." The· check was 
cashed. There is no dispute on that point (R. 106). 
The testimony of Mrs. White was that she refused to 
make any modification of the original contract and that no 
modification was made (R. 167). But there is no dispute con-
cerning the fact that a check for $2000.00, dated January 7, 
1951, to defendants' order was cashed by defendants, and that 
thereafter monthly Mr. or Mrs. White came into the office of 
plaintiffs and picked up checks (parenthetically, not cash or cer-
tified checks) in the sum of $1000.00 each, and that these checks 
were dated, respectively, February 7th, March 7th, April 7th and 
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May 7th (R. 126. See also Answer R. 35, par. 4. To the effect 
that Mr. or Mrs. White came to plaintiffs' office every month 
seeR. 106-107. See also R. 123). 
Mr. Loveland testified that between January and July 1, 
1951, he had numerous conversations with Mr. and Mrs. 
White on the telephone wherein Mrs. White stated that de-
fendants wanted to get one of the $1000.00 per month pay-
ments (R. 54-56). Loveland stated that Mr. White told him 
in a conversation in his office during this period of time that 
"they have been lenient and allowed them this $1000.00 a 
month, but even then they were delinquent in making their 
payments a few days. * * * He said also that he would like 
very much to buy the property back and asked me if I would 
ask Mr. Sieverts if he would sell it back to them or just give 
them their money back on the deal. * * * " (R. 54) . 
The Trial Court made no finding whatsoever with respect 
to the question of oral modification or modification by opera· 
tion of law of the original written contract. 
It is not disputed that a letter in longhand dated July 19, 
1951, was sent by defendants to plaintiffs. It stated: Defs. 
Ex. 14). · 
'·you will recall that the Inland Development Co. 
is now delinquent on the contract dated June 7, 1950 
for the purchase of our land at about 34th So. & 28th 
E. and this letter is to notify you that unless we re· 
ceive all payments and the interest now due under the 
contract within 20 days from the date of this letter 
we will cancel the contract. 
10 
Donald M. White 
Lavine H. White." 
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Nor is it disputed in the evidence that this letter was re-
ceived by Abraham Sievert, Jr., in the mail on July 21, 1951. 
On August 7, 1951, a telephone conversation occurred 
between 1-Ir. and Mrs. White an the one hand and Abraham 
Sieverts, Nlr. Loveland and Mrs. Christopherson, who works 
for 1\lr. Loveland, on the other. Plaintiffs' testimony was that 
Mr. Sieverts and Mr. Loveland told Mrs. White that they 
needed the abstract brought up to date for examination (R. 
56, 58, 108, 121). Mrs. White stated that she did not have 
any deed prepared but that she would come in that afternoon, 
sign the deed, pick up the check and deliver the abstract (R. 61). 
Mr. Loveland testified that at first she did not want to accept 
plaintiff's check but she stated that she would accept Loveland's 
Inland Realty check and that she would take Loveland's figures 
for the balance due (R. 58, 87). Loveland's testimony is abso-
lutely clear that Mrs. White· stated she would come in on the 
7th before five o'clock. 
Mrs. White stated on the stand that this conversation was 
to the effect that she would accept Loveland's computation of 
the balance due, and that she wanted a cashier's check. She 
denied that she ever agreed to. accept Loveland's check, and 
she denied that she stated she would come in that afternoon. 
She does not deny that she had no deed prepared or that she 
had ever signed a deed containing a description of the property 
in the contract. There is no evidence that she ever at any time 
tendered a deed to plaintiffs. 
It is undisputed that neither of the defendants came into 
the office on the day of August 7th. Upon their failure to ar-
rive some few minutes before five o'clock on the afternoon 
11 
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of the 7th, Mr. Loveland and Mr. Sieverts suggested a letter 
to l\{rs. Christopherson, and she prepared a letter addressed 
to defendants at their home (R. 103). This letter was mailed 
on the 7th, special delivery. It offered a check to defendants' 
order in the amount of $5,265.03 without stating the drawer, 
drawee, or type of check. (Pls. Ex. D.) 
This letter was presented by special delivery to Mr. White 
at his residence on the morning of. August 8th. He refused to 
accept delivery of the letter (R. 15 3-154). It is obvious that 
neither Mr. White nor Mrs. White would know what the 
letter contained at that time. Neither of them called by tele-
phone or otherwise at the place of business of plaintiffs or Mr. 
Loveland to determine the contents of the letter or to deter-
mine any other fact concerning the transaction. 
It is significant that Mrs. White testified at her deposition 
that when she prepared the notice in July, 1951, she did not 
know, and she did not want to know, the amounts paid or the 
balance due from plaintiffs (R. 140) . 
It is important to make clear to the Court that the fact is, 
and the record shows, that when defendants refused delivery on 
· August 8, 1951, they had tendered no deed to plaintiffs; they 
did not know what was contained in the letter the acceptance 
of delivery of which they refused, and did not know whether 
there was cash, check, letter of explanation or anything else 
in the letter. From that time until the present they have refused 
to accept any sum whateve~, whether in cash or check or other-
wise, in payment of th~ b~lance due on the contract. 
The reason this consideration is important is that despitr 
12 
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the fact that there was no indication in the answer in this case 
that there was any deficiency in tender, nor had there been 
any. indication prior to that time, at the trial defendants were 
permitted to offer evidence from the records of the Central 
Branch of the Continental Bank to the effect that on August 
7 and 8, 1951, the indicated balance of Inland Development 
Company was $91.99 ( R. 205) . The ledger card from the bank 
indicated that Inland Realty Company had a very active account, 
fluctuating widely so far as the balance was concerned (~. 
205) . The evidence shows that plaintiffs and Mr. Love~and 
had several accounts at the Continental Bank, Central Branch 
(R. 212). 
The evidence further shows, and it is unimpeached in 
any ''"ay, that plaintiffs had cash in their office in a large amount 
on both August 7 and 8, 1951 (R. 220, 221, et seq.) Abraham 
Sieverts, Jr., testified· that in addition to the account on Inland 
Development Company he had authority to draw on the ac-
counts of Luxaire Heating, Sunbeam Heating, a ranch account 
and Star Supply. He testified that there were moneys in the 
bank which could have been used to cover the check to de-
fendants (R. 219, 220). He further stated that he had a credit 
at Central Branch of Continental Bank Company, and that 
he was sure the check would have been honored (R. 220-221). 
Both in the complaint and at the trial plaintiffs tendered 
to defendants the sum of $5265.03, or such other amount as 
may be determined by the Court to be the correct balance on 
the contract. Defendants have refused the offer but never made 
objection to the form or substance of the tender, and have de-
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dined to convey the property. At no time have defendants or 
either of them, or any person acting in their behalf, tendered 
any deed to plaintiffs whatsoever. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT NO. I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE FIND-
INGS OF FACT ON RELEVANT AND DETERMIN ATIVJ: 
ISSUES. 
(a) As to whether there was a modification, oral or by 
operation of law, of the original contract. · 
(b) As to whether defendants at any time te11dered a deed 
to plaintiffs, and particularly whether a deed was tendered iu 
sufficient manner as to place plaintiffs in default. 
(c) As to whether defendants at any time objected to tbc 
sufficiency in form or substance of plaintiffs' tender. of tbe 
balance of the contract. 
(d) As to whether defendants willfully avoided payment 
by plaintiffs of the unpaid balance of the purchase price. 
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POINT NO. II 
\\-'HERE THERE IS NO OBJECTION RAISED TO A 
TENDER BY CHECK, SUCH A TENDER IS SUFFICIENT. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFEND-
ANTS WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE CONTRACT 
CANCELLED INASMUCH AS DEFENDANTS DID NOT 
AT ANY TIME TENDER TO PLAINTIFFS A DEED TO 
THE PROPERTY OR OTHER PERFORMANCE. 
POINT IV 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE NOT SUPPORT-
ED BY THE FINDINGS, AND THE DECREE IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND/OR 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE COURT ERRED IN.FAILING TO MAKE FIND-
INGS OF FACT ON RELEVANT AND DETERMINATIVE 
ISSUES. 
A party is entitled to have the Court make findings of 
fact on the relevant and material issues with respect to his 
theory of the case. 
15 
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-In the case at bar the Trial Court took particular pains 
to require plaintiffs to plead in detail their theory as set out 
in the statement of facts in this brief. The plaintiffs did in fact 
plead with considerable particularity. Plaintiffs and appellants 
desire to point out to the Court in this portion of the argument 
that despite the requirement of the Court that pleadings be 
detailed, the Findings were equivocal, evasive and in some 
instances there were no findings whatsoever. upon the issues. 
The sub-headings on this point are the issues on which the 
Court either made no findings or inadequate findings. 
(a) As to whether there was a modification) oral or by 
operation of law, of the original contract. 
The third amended complaint alleged: 
"3. That on or about December 15, 1950, the parties 
orally agreed that the balance of the purchase price 
should be payable in monthly installments of $1,000.00 
or more per month until payment in full of the unpaid 
balance of the purchase price." (R. 32-33). 
Paragraph 3 of defendants' answer explicitly denied these 
allegations (R. 35). The Findings of Fact by the Court may 
be searched in vain for any determination of this extremely 
important issue. It will be recalled that the testimony of plain-
tiffs was that there was a conversation early in the month of 
January, 1951, .at which time Abraham Sieverts, Jr., speaking 
for the plaintiffs, stated that they could not make the payments 
due, and that they desired to negotiate other terms. The 
last thing said in this conversation was that if defendants 
did not desire to accept the proposed modification they should 
not cash the check, which was delivered to them. The evi-
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deuce is clear and the fact admitted that defendants did cash the 
check and that from January tluough May they continued to 
accept monthly checks in the sum of $1000.00. 
Certainly, whether or not the contract was orally modified 
or whether the acceptance of the $1000.00 payments consti-
tuted a waiver within the meaning of the law or relevant issues 
of fact and law should be determined by the Court. Failure 
to make findings on the question constitutes reversible error. 
(b) As to whether defendants at any time tendered a deed 
to plaintiffs, and particula,-ly whether a deed was tendered in 
sufficient manner as to place plaintiffs in default. 
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to furnish to 
plaintiffs a certified abstract of title or any evidence of market-
able title to the land, or any statement with respect to whether 
there was a mortgage against the property. They aUeged fur-
ther that defendants notified plaintiffs orally that they would 
not furnish an abstract of title until or unless plaintiffs first 
paid the balance of the purchase price; and it was alleged 
further that defendants refused to execute a warranty deed at 
the time of plaintiffs' tender. (Plaintiffs' third amended com-
plaint, Paragraphs 6 and 7; R. 33). These allegations were 
explicitly denied in the answer (R. 3 S) . 
Plaintiffs further alleged in their reply: 
"plaintiffs allege that defendants declared that the 
amount necessary to pay said purchase price in full 
on August 7, 1951, was the sum of $5,265.03 and 
plaintiffs tendered said amount to defendants and de-
manded that def~ndants execute a ( nd) deliver a deed 
of conveyance, and defendants promised to meet with 
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------------------------~ ... 
plaintiffs for said purpose on August 7, 1951, but 
failed and neglected to do so; * * * " (R. 39-40). 
As indicated in Point No. III of this brief, whether or 
not defendants made a sufficient tender of a deed concurrently 
with their demand for plaintiffs' performance goes to the very 
heart of this lawsuit. Certainly such issue is a material and rele-
vant question for determination. 
Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact sets out the de-
fendants' theory that they notified plaintiffs of plaintiffs' de-
linquency, and in Paragraph 12 the Court found that defend-
ants requested payment "and ~hat upon receipt of payment in 
that form they would execute a deed to the property described 
in the contract," but the Court failed to make a finding as 
to whether there was in fact a tender by defendants of a deed. 
Paragraph 12 constitutes an evasion of the issue rather than a 
finding upon it. 
Paragraph 14 of the Findings alleges in glowing generali-
ties "that on August 7 and August 8, 1951 (defendants) were 
ready, willing and able to execute a proper deed to plaintiffs,"· 
all of which is equivocation and immaterial. The law requires 
a tender. 
Here, again, the attempt to circumvent legal requirements 
by failing to make findings on material facts is conclusively 
apparent. The law requiring a tender at the time of a demand 
for performance of a bilateral contract for the sale of real 
property is discussed under Point III of this brief. 
It is respectfully submitted that the failure of the Trial 
Court to make findings on this vital subject constitutes revers-
ible error. 
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(c) As to whether defendants at any time objected to tbe 
sufficiency in form or substance of plaintiffs' tender of the 
balance of the contract. 
The third amended complaint of plaintiffs alleged that 
plaintiffs tendered to defendants the sum of $5265.0} on or 
about August 7, 1951 (Par. 7; R. 33). 
It is denied by the answer (R. 35) and Paragraph 7 of 
the reply again alleged the tender of the check, and Paragraph 
8 alleged that defendants "never having made any correction 
of said representation, defendants were and are estopped to 
assert that the tender made by plaintiffs was insufficient or that 
plaintiffs failed to tender the balance timely" (R. 40) . 
There is absolutely no dispute in the testimony that on 
August 7, 1951, despite the fact that defendants had failed to 
come into plaintiffs' office as agreed upon the telephone that 
day, plaintiffs sent through the mail a letter addressed to de-
fendants, again offering to pay the amount due upon receipt 
of a deed, proper abstracts or title insurance. The record is also 
clear, and this is extremely important, that when the registered 
letter was delivered to defendants' residence on the morning 
of August 8, 1951, within the twenty-day period provided by 
the notice, the letter was refused. Defendants did not know 
at that time the contents of the letter, but the refusal was on 
the ground that it was late, and was not upon any other ground. 
(See the testimony of Mr. WhiteR. 134). 
The importance of a finding as to the basis for the rejec-
tion of this letter and the tender contained therein is fully 
discussed under Point No. II of this brief. The law is clear 
that any objection to a tender must be made at the time thereof. 
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-Defendants cannot sit back and refuse to accept an offer of per-
formance without notifying plaintiffs wherein the performance 
is insufficient, and then complain at a later time that the tender 
was improperly made. 
The Utah statute (Sec. 104-54-10 U.C.A. 1943) requires 
that the "person to whom a tender is made must at the time 
specify any objection he may have to the money, instrument 
or property, or he is deemed to have waived * * * ". 
The failure of the Court to make findings on this sub-
ject, therefore goes to the core of the dispute. It is, of course, 
clear that any finding would have to be made against defend-
ants' position, but that does not avoid the necessity of the 
finding on such an important question. 
(d) As to whether defendants willfully avoided paymellt 
by plaintiffs of the unpaid balance of the purchase price. 
Plaintiffs alleged "that defendants willfully avoided pay-
ment of the alleged unpaid balance of the purchase price, and 
they are estopped to claim default on the part of plaintiffs" 
(R. 40). The significance of the allegation is apparent. 
From and after August 7, 1951, until the present time 
plaintiffs have tendered good and sufficient performance to 
defendants. The response from defendants has been equivo-
cation and refusal to comply in any way whatsoever. At the 
same time defendants have been so vocal in their complaints 
of plaintiffs' alleged non-performance, they have refused 
and neglected to perform their own part of the bargain. They 
have yet to tender a deed and they have yet to tender an 
abstract or title insurance policy for. examination. The evidence 
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is uncontradicted that the value of the real property was en-
hanced. It is obvious that the reason defendants refused to 
perform was that they hoped to get a better deal from some 
other purchaser. Again, the only real reason for failure to 
make findings on the issue is that the facts and inferences 
were in support of plaintiffs' allegations. 
"16. That at the execution of the contract on June 
7, 1950 ,the buyers exercised their option to receive such 
evidence of title and that an abstract covering approxi-
mately 10 acres of the property described in said con-
tract was furnished to the agent of the plaintiffs, one 
McKay Loveland, and continued for plaintiffs at the 
request of their agent, the said McKay Loveland, and 
that a request for a policy of totle insurance on the 
remaining land covered by the contract was made by 
the said McKay Loveland, as agent for the plaintiffs, 
and that the said McaKy Loveland charged the de-
fendants in the closing statement that was submitted 
to the defendants at the time of the execution of the 
contract for the continuation of the abstract and the 
title insurance and that the said McKay Loveland was 
paid for both the continuation of the abstract and the 
necessary title insurance by the defendants at the time 
of the execution of the contract." (R. 238). 
This finding is in the light of plaintiffs' allegation: 
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"6. That on or about August 1, 1951, plaintiffs. re· 
quested defendants to furnish . abstract of title · con-
tinued to date for purposes of examination of title and 
to ascertain whether there was any unpaid mortgage 
indebtedness against said real property; but defendants 
refused to furnish either an abstract of title or anr 
other evidence of marketable title, and defendants 
notifiied plaintiffs orally· that they· would not furnish 
any abstract of title until or unless plaintiffs first paid 
the balance of the purchase price." (R. 33). 
Defendants denied the allegation in Paragraph 5 of their 
answer (R. 35). The testimony is uncontradicted that plain-
tiffs had never been afforded the opportunity of examination 
of the only abstract furnished, "Exhibit G," prior to the trial. 
This abstract did not cover all the property (R. 196, 197), 
and it was in the possession of Mr. Loveland, who is not an 
attorney, only over· night in June, 1950, and never at a 
later time. It had never been examined by plaintiffs or 
for them with a view to a determination of the suffi-
ciency of the title. Evidence concerning the lack of the 
title insurance policy on the property not covered by the ab-
stract runs through the entire case. 
Of particular interest is the fact that a woman from Mrs. 
White's telephone number called Security Title Company and 
ordered title insurance in May, 1950, but no insurance was 
ever issued on the property (R. 159·162). Certainly there was 
no title insurance policy ever presented to plaintiffs for their 
examination. The practice is, of course, for such insurance to 
be issued in the name of the buyer (R. 202). No one has even 
suggested that the defendants have ever obtained such a 
policy for any property involved in this case. There is no 
evidence in the record, moreover, that either sellers or buyers 
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exercised o1n option as to whether an abstract or title insurance 
should be furnished on this part of the property. 
Yet the Trial Court glosses over this whole problem in 
the· face of plaintiffs' direct allegations that they have not 
been furnished an abstract, despite repeated requests (Para-
graphs 6 and 7 of the third amended complaint; R. 33). The 
necessity for defendants' performance of their agreement in 
this respect is also treated in Point No. III of this brief. Cer-
tainly the Court dearly erred in failing to make any clear, 
positive or direct findings of fact on the issue. 
POINT NO. II 
WHERE THERE IS NO OBJECTION RAISED TO A 
TENDER BY CHECK, SUCH A TENDER IS SUFFICIENT. 
There is no dispute as to the fact that a communication 
dated July 19, 1951, was received by Abraham Sieverts, Jr., 
on July 21, 1951. Said communication was introduced in evi-
dence on defendants' "Exhibit 4." It is a letter in longhand 
as follows: 
Inland Development Co., 
"Salt Lake City, Utah 
July 19, 1951 
A Sieverts Jr. 253·3 E 21st So 
Salt Lake City Ut 
Gentlemen: 
You will recall that the Inland Development Co is 
now delinquent on the contract dated June 7 1950 
for the purchase price of our land at about 34th So 
& 28th E. and this letter is to notify you that unless we 
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receive all payments and the interest now due under 
the contract within 20 days from the date of this letter 
we will cancel· the contract. 
Donald M. White· 
Lavine H. White." 
The language "within .. 20 days from the date of this 
letter" means as a matter of law 20 days after the date of 
the letter. The day of the letter's writing is excluded. See cases 
abstracted at 45 Words and Phrases, p. 382 et seq. 
Plaintiffs had to and including August 8, .1951, pursuant 
to the provis10ns of this letter, within which to make their 
payment. The Court's attention is invited parenthetically to 
the fact that defendants did not in this letter tender a deed 
pursuant to the contract of June 7, 1951, or any other contract. 
There is no indication at any place in the record that defend-
ants tendered a deed to plaintiffs at any time prior to or in 
fact after August 7, 1951. Defendants have never tendered 
a deed and are not in a position to default plaintiffs when they 
have not tendered their own performance. This proposition 
is argued elsewhere in this brief. 
Plaintiffs' evidence, including the testimony of Mr. McKay 
M. Loveland, Mrs. Iris R. Christopherson and Mr. Abraham 
Sieverts, Jr., was to the effect that both Mr. and Mrs. \Vhite 
stated that they would be in the office of plaintiffs with an 
abstract to sign a deed (prepared by plaintiffs at defendants' 
request,) on the afternoon of August 7th,. before five 
P.M. (R. 58, 87). Neither of defendants came to plaintiffs' 
office on that day. Plaintiffs thereupon prepared a letter to 
defendants, a copy of which was introduced in evidence as 
"Exhibit D." It is as follows: 
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"August 7, 1951 
~ir. and Mrs. Donald M. White 
28 3 3 Mile reek Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. White: 
We hereby wish to inform you that we have in our 
possession to be paid to you a check in the amount of 
$5,265.03, which is for payment in full for property 
at Salt Lake City, purchased by Inland Development 
Company. We have been instructed to surrender check 
to you upon your delivering a Warranty Deed for said 
property to Inland Development Company. 
"If you will please come into our office, you can 
sign the Warranty Deed here. 
Very truly yours, 
INLAND REALTORS, INC. 
BY-------------·---------------------.,. 
There is attached to this letter a receipt for registered 
article No. 487, dated August 7, 1951, post marked as of that 
date in the Sugar House Station Post Office at Salt Lake City, 
Utah. There is no dispute that this letter was refused by Mr. 
Donald M. White at his place of residence on the morning of 
August 8, 1951. "Exhibit E," which is the envelope containing 
the letter introduced as "Exhibit D" was returned unopened 
to plaintiffs. 
The Court's attention is invited to the fact that before 
this time every single payment made on the contract, after 
the original down payment of $7000.00, was made at the 
office of plaintiffs at 2263 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, 
by check (R. 106, 107). No deed had been prepared by de-
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fendants, and plaintiffs. had told Mr. Loveland that they would 
accept his figures for settlement and he had told them that he 
would prepare a deed for their signature. 
The record is clear that the registered letter, "Exhibit 
D," was refused by defendants on the ground that Mr. White 
thought it came one day after the time prescribed by defendants' 
notice. ~lrs. White stated in her deposition that she did not 
want to know the amount or the balance owed by plaintiffs 
when she wrote the amount or the balance owed by plaintiffs 
when she wrote her letter of July 19, 1951 (R. 140). Mr. 
White testified in his deposition: 
"Question, 'Why did you refuse that letter?' 
Answer, 'Well, I figured that they were just trying 
to pull a fast one by sending a registered letter up there 
with a check the day after, when they were told, the 
day before, to be up there with the money. I made it 
very definite that they were to be at the house with 
the money before morning on the 7th. I gave them 
till midnight. There was no excuse for them to put the 
check in the mail.' 
"Question, 'When the letter came, did you look at 
the envelope to see whom it was from?' 
"Answer, 'NO.' 
"Have I read your statement as you gave it to the 
reporter at the time your deposition was taken? 
"MR. FINLINSON: I think you will find-
A. No. 
MR. FINLINSON: -that it was-
Q. Your answer is 'NO'? You have made two 
changes in that deposition, have you not? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. As I have now read it to you, you changed the 
7th to the 8th? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You changed the 'No' to 'Yes'? 
A. That's right." (R. 154). 
The suggestion that the deadline was the 7th rather than 
the 8th appears to have been made by counsel between the 
time of the deposition and the time of the trial. The record 
is as follows on re-direct examination: 
··By Mr. Burton: 
Q. Mr. White, you ~aid in your deposition, 'I gave 
them till midnight.' You prefaced that with the re-
mark , 'I figured they were trying to pull a fast one by 
sending the registered letter up there the day after.' 
There is no doubt that the letter got there on the 8th, 
is there? 
A. It·got there the morning of the 8th. 
Q. And so that's what you meant when you say it 
got there the day after the midnight deadline that you 
had given? 
A. That's right." (R. 155, 156). 
It is thus clear that the reason, and the only reason, the 
registered letter was refused was because of the defendants· 
belief that the last day to respond to their letter of July 19th 
was August 7th rather than August 8th. The question is: When 
the tender is refused on this ground, can defendants object 
that the tender was made by check rather than by cash? 
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The Utah Statute and the cases generally·provide a clear 
answer. Since no objection was raised to the form or sufficiency 
of the tender at the time it was made, and particularly, since 
the tender_ has been remade in the pleadin.gs and during the 
trial of this cause, defendants are in no position to raise the 
ISSUe. 
Section 104-54-10 of the Utah Code provides: 
"The person to whom a tender is made must, at the 
time, specify any objection he may have to the money, 
instrument or property, or he is deemed to have waived 
it; and, if the objection is to the amount of money, the 
terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of prop-
erty, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind which 
he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards." 
This Court held in Hirsh vs. Ogden Furniture & Carpet 
Co., 48 Utah, 434, 160 Pac. 283, that this section of the Code 
means that where a tender is made by check, the person to 
whom it is tendered must specify his objections or he will 
be deemed to have waived all objections such as he insists 
upon when tender is made. The Court stated further that a 
tender , by check by mail is good in the absence of special 
objections. The Court stated: 
"Under a similar statute the Supreme Court of Cali· 
fornia has repeatedly held that where a tender is ma_de 
by check the person to whom it is tendered must speofy 
his objections or he will be deemed to have waived 
all objections except such. as he insists upon when 
the tender is made. Lowe v. Yolo, etc., County, 8 Cal. 
App. 167, 96 Pac. 379, and cases there cited; Wright 
v. John A. Robinson Co., 84 Hun. 172, 32 N. Y. 
Supp. 463, Nidever v. Hall, 67 Cal. 79, 7 Pac. 136; 
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Cleveland v. Toby, 36 11isc. Rep. 319, 73 N. Y. Supp. 
544. ~n \V_right v. John A. Robinson Co., supra, the 
questiOn ot tender by check by mailing the same, as in 
this case, was involved, and it was there held that in 
the absence of special objections such a tender is good. 
In the case of Cleveland v. Toby, supra, tender was 
made by mailing a check as here, and in view that it 
was kept good it was held sufficient." ( 160 Pac. 
285-6). 
The Court stated further at Page 28 7: 
"This is but justice as well as common sense. Indeed, 
our statute (section 348 7) provides that unless the 
person to whom the tender is made objects to the amount 
of the tender and specifies the amount he is 'precluded 
from objecting afterward.' By this we do not mean to 
be understood as holding that. a tender of a nominal 
sum in payment of a debt of a larger amount would be 
good, and especially not where the person making the 
tender knew what the amount due was. That such is 
not the intention of the statute is clearly pointed out 
by Mr. Chief Justice Beatty in the case of Colton v. 
Oakland Bank, 137 Cal. 376, 70 Pac. 225. That the 
statute, however, applies with full force in a case like 
the one at bar is as dearly held in the cases we have 
hereinbefore cited.'' 
That there were no special objections in this case could 
not be more clear upon the record. Both Mr. and Mrs. White 
admit that they did not call the plaintiffs or get in touch with 
them otherwise by any means of comunication after they 
rejected the letter of August 7, 1951 (R. 138). 
The Utah rule conforms to the majority of the cases in 
jurisdictions both with and without the kind of statute in 
effect here. 
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I 
The editors of 62 Corpus Juris at Page 668 state the 
law as follows: 
"6. WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS-a. IN GENERAL. 
As a general rule objections to the medium in which 
tender is made may be waived, and this rule is statu-
tory in some jurisdictions. 
"b. BANK NOTES OR OTHER LAWFUL MON-
EY. Thus, an objection to a tender of bank bills or other 
money not legal tender, but which is lawful money, 
current and circulating at par, is deemed to be waived, 
if at the time the money is offered objection be not 
taken that the money is not legal tender. An acceptance 
of the tender is a waiver of an objection to the quality 
of the money tendered. 
"c. CHECKS. A tender of payment by a check is as 
effective as a tender of currency if the objection is 
expressly waived, or if there be no timely objection 
to this form of tender. Thus, if the check is retained, or 
returned without objection of any kind, or where it is 
refused, not on the ground that it is not legal tendel', 
but upon some other ground, as that it is not draw11 
for the sum the creditor demands, or that it is not 
made in time, the objection to the check is waived and 
the tender is good as far as the medium of paymeJtt 
is concerned." (Italics ours). 
The law is stated in 23 A.L.R., 1288, as follows: 
"While, as above shown, a check is not ordinarily 
a good medium of tender where objection is raised on 
the ground that the tender is by check instead of in 
money, yet it is also well settled that this objection 
may be waived, and it is generally regarded as waived 
unless expressly made at the time. This is especially 
true, as appears quite frequently in the cases, where 
the creditor bases his refusal to accept the check on 
other grounds than the form of the tender. In support 
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of. th~ proposition that the creditor may waive the 
?bJechon .to a tender by check, through failure to ob-
Ject on thts ground at the time the tender is made, are 
the following cases . . . " 
Numerous cases from twenty-six different jurisdictions are 
cited in support of the rule. For the convenience of the Court 
the following discussion is reprinted here from 23 A.L.R., 
Pages 1289 and 1290: 
"The same principle is supported by other cases not 
within the scope of the annotation, such as Williams 
v. Rorer ( 1842) 7 Mo. 556, to the effect that a tender 
made in bank bills is good unless objection is made 
to the medium of the tender. 
"So, in Neal v. Finley ( 1910) 136 Ky. 346, 124 
S. W. 348, the court said generally: 'It is true that 
ordinarily a tender of payment in any way than by 
legal-tender money is not good. But the parties may 
waive that feature of the law. If tender is made in bank 
bills, or check, the tender will be deemed sufficient 
(provided, in case of check, the drawer has sufficient 
funds in the bank to meet the payment), unless the 
refusal is based upon the ground that the tender is 
not in lawful money.' 
"It was said in McGrath v. Gegner ( 1893) 77 Md. 
331, 39 Am. St. Rep. 415, 26 Atl. 502, that it was well 
settled that where a tender is made by a check on a 
bank, and the tender is refused not because of the 
character or quality of the tender itself, but on other 
grounds, the tender thus made and refused will be con-
sidered in law a lawful tender, for the reason that 
all objections to the character of the tender will be 
considered as having been waived, and for the further 
reason that, if objection had been made on the ground 
that the tender was not made in lawful money, the 
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party would have had the opportunity of obtaining 
the money and making a good and valid tender. 
·"The tender, even ·of an uncertified check, is suffi-
cient if not objected to at the· time on that ground. 
Bunte v. Schumann ( 1905) 46 Misc. 593, 92 N. Y. 
Supp. 806. 
"The reasons for the doctrine that, if the creditor 
bases his refusal to accept the check in payment on 
grounds other than the form of the tender, he will 
be deemed to have waived this objection, are well 
stated in Smith v. Reserve Loan L. Inc. Co. ( 1916) 
267 Mo. 342, 184 S. W. 464, where the court, after 
citing various cases in support of the rule that a tender 
of bank notes, checks, or drafts, or other orders for 
the payment of money, if not objected to for failure 
to produce legal-tender money, will not be valid be-
cause not falling within the description of money made 
legal tender ,said: 'The reasoning of these cases is that 
the creditor, when offered such representatives of legal-
tender money, if he is not willing to accept them as 
such, should put his refusal on that ground, so that 
the debtor may have the opportunity to secure the 
specific money which the law prescribes shall be ac-
cepted in payment of any debts expressly to be payable 
in dollars. Hence, it is deemed only just that the holder 
of such an obligation, upon tender of the payment 
thereof in bank notes or such things as represent 
money in the marts of trade and commerce, shall state 
expressly the ground of his rejection in order that 
the debtor may comply with the technical law requir-
ing a tender of a particular kind of money. The non-
observance of this duty necessarily misleads the debtor, 
any may inflict a loss which would be avoided if the 
creditor had stated that he objected to the form and 
character of the tender. He should, therefore, be 
estopped from subsequently urging an objection which 
he suppressed at the time of the offer, if his later 
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insistet~Ce thereon would in1lict a loss or damage upon 
a ~redttor . (debtor) who, in re_liance on his implied 
wruver, faded to produce the kmd of money made a 
legal tender by law.' 
··In Ricketts v. Buckstaff ( 1902) 64 Neb. 851, 90 
1\. \V. 915, where a tender by check was refused on 
the ground of the insufficiency of the amount. the 
court laid down the rule that, in determining the 
sufficiency of a tender which is rejected on specific 
grounds, other objections to the tender will not be 
considered, but are waived. 
"And the rule was considered elementary in Murphy 
v. Gold & Stock Teleg. Co. (1889) 24 N.Y. S. R. 123, 
3 N. Y. Supp. 804, that one who rejects an offer or 
tender upon one or more specific grounds of objection 
cannot afterwards raise another which might have been 
obviated if it had been made at the proper time. 
"In Schaeffer v. Coldren (1912) 237 Pa. 77, 85 
Atl. 98, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 175, the court said: 'It is 
also objected that the tender of certified checks was 
not a valid legal tender within the meaning of the 
law. It is true it was not a legal tender in money, but 
it has been frequently held that objection to the 
medium in which the tender is made may be waived. 
If no objection be made on the ground that it is not 
lawful money, a certificate of deposit is a sufficient 
tender. So, too, if a check be tendered by a debtor who 
has sufficient money in bank to pay it, and the creditor 
refuses to receive it for some other reason, but not 
because it is a check, the tender is valid.' 
"In Gundy v. Ingram (1910) 57 Wash. 97, 36 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 232, 106 Pac. 495, the court said in 
effect that it was well established that a creditor may 
\\'aive the character of the money which is tendered, by 
raising no objection to the payment on ~he gro~md that 
it is not the character of money or specte that IS called 
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I 
for in the obligation, or by rarsmg some other ob-
jection which would exclude the idea of objection on 
~hat ground; and that, in view of the fact that probably 
90 per cent of business is now transacted through the 
medium of checks, drafts, etc., instead of the transfer 
of gold and silver coin ,or other species of legal tender, 
it would be a dangerous rule, which could easily be 
tun1ed into an engine of oppression, that a tender of 
payment, especially where it involves the maturing of 
obligations not then due, could not be made by check 
where no question is raised as to the value of the check 
tendered, and especially where, as in the case before 
it, was shown that formr payments had been made by 
checks, which were not objected to by the creditor." 
The following cases in addition support the rule that 
the creditor may waive objection to a tender by check through 
failure to object on this ground: 
CALIFORNIA-Stevens v. Hines ( 1923) 63 Cal. App. 
80, 218 Pac. 57. 
ILLINOI5-Raginsky v. Lawler ( 1924) }13 Ill. 411, 
145 N. E. 189. 
IOWA-Murray v. American Sav. Bank ( 1924) 197 
Iowa, 318, 197 N. W. 69; Steckel v. Selis (1924) 
198 Iowa, 339, 197 N. W. 918. 
MASSACHUSETTs-Minsky v. Zieve (reported here· 
with) ante, 391. 
MICHIGAN .~ Murphy v. Frank P. Miller Corp. 
(1924) 229 Mich. 162, 200 N. W. 974. 
OKLAHOMA-Rupard v. Rees ( 1923) 94 Okla. 49, 
220 Pac. 893; American Oil & Ref. Co. v. Clem-
ents ( 1924) 99 Okla. 204, 225 Pac. 349. 
OREGON-Hawkins v. Fuller (1925) 116 Or. -U1. 
240 Pac. 549. 
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TEXA.s-Eureka Producing Co. v. Hoyt (1924)-Tex. 
Ctv. App .....• 266 S. W. 203. 
\v'EST VIRGINIA-Bickel v. Sheppard ( 1925) 98 
\Y/. Va. 305, 127 S. E. 41. 
In Sta·ens t-'. Hines, 63 Cal. App. 80, 218 Pac. 57, a check 
was "post-dated," the date being subsequent to the tender 
but before the obligation was due. The Court held that the , 
tender was good, it having been rejected on other grounds. 
The Oklahoma court held in Rupard v. Rees, 94 Okla., 
49, 220 Pac. 89}, that where the objection is not timely made 
by the payee on the ground that the tender is by check, so that 
the drawer has an opportunity to obtain the money tendered, 
the objection will have been waived. The check in this case 
was refused on the ground that the creditor had not been 
paid all of a previous payment due. 
We think as the Utah court stated tn the Hirsh case, 
supra, "This is justice as well as common sense." The theory 
of the Utah statute is that the person making the tender has 
.1 right to know the reason for its objection, so that if he deems 
the reason valid, he can protect himself and conform to the 
objection. 
The reason for the rule is perfectly apparent in the case 
at bar where the defendants want to stand upon an uncon-
scionable and inequitable technicality to deprive plaintiffs of 
their interest in the land. The rule prescribed by our statute 
applies not only to checks but "the terms of the instrument." 
It may be that upon reflection an attorney may draw a different 
kind of instrument than is "Exhibit D," the letter of August 7, 
1951. Perhaps upon further consideration the tender would 
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have been made in person or by the sheriff or in cash or in 
some other way, but "Exhibit D" cannot be considered outside 
the context of its preparation and delivery. 
Defendants had already stated that they would be in 
plaintiffs' office to sign the deed. They had stated that they 
did not have the deed prepared. They had indicated .assent 
to Mr. Loveland's computation of the balance. They had not 
delivered an abstract for examination upon request. They 
had furnished no abstract or title insurance policy upon 
the relatively small but important portion of the land involved. 
They had never tendered a deed. Under these circumstances, 
particularly in view of our statute, is it not unconscionable to 
permit defendants to decline to receive a registered letter 
containing "Exhibit D," without defendants even knowing the 
contents of the letter? 
Certainly the holding of the Trial Court in this respect 
contravenes the spirit, intention and explicit provisions of the 
Utah statute. Certainly the holding is a shocking displ~y of 
the lack of "conscience" of a chancellor. It is respectfully 
submitted that the Trial Court erred in failing to find that 
plaintiffs' tender of performance was sufficient under the 
circumstances, and that defendants cannot now complain of 
the sufficiency of plaintiffs' offer of performance. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFEND-
ANTS WERE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE CONTRACT 
CANCELLED INASMUCH AS DEFENDANTS DID NOT 
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AT ANY Tl!vlE TENDER TO PLAINTIFFS A DEED TO 
THE PROPERTY OR OTHER PERFORMANCE. 
The evidence is dear that neither at the time of the send-
ing of the letter dated July 19, 1951, nor on August 7th, nor 
on August 8th, nor at any other time relevant in this proceed-
ing, did the defendants or either of them tender a deed for 
the property described in the contract to plaintiffs. As here-
-tofore indicated, defendants did indicate to plaintiffs . in a tele-
phone conversation on August. 7th that they would be in to 
plaintiffs' office to sign a deed, but there was no deed tendered 
with the notice of July 19th, and defendants did not come 
into plaintiffs' office or communicate with them in any other 
way to tender a deed at or after that date. 
The contract in question provides, "The seller on receiv-
ing the payments herein reserved to be paid at the times and 
in the manner above mentioned, agrees to execute and deliver 
to the buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed 
conveying the title to the above described premises free and 
clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned, and 
except as may have occurred or by or through the acts or 
neglect of the buyer, and to furnish at his expense, an abstract 
or policy of title insurance, at the option of the seller, brought 
to date at time of sale or at time of delivery of deed at the 
option of the buyer" (R. 2). 
The contract thus provided for concurrent performance 
by the buyer and the seller when the last payment by the 
buyer became due. The rule is uniformly expressed that under 
such circumstances a seller cannot put a buyer in default 
without tendering to the buyer a deed in accordance with the 
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requirements of the contract. A case closely analogous is 
Davis v. C. E. Downie Investment Co., (Sup. Ct. of \Vash. 
1934) 38 Pac. (2nd) 215. There a written executory contract 
provided for the payments of purchase price of land in in-
stallments and for the delivery of a deed to the buyer upon 
payment of the last installment. Time was made of the essence 
of the contract and it was provided that the contract could be 
cancelled and the buyer's rights forfeited in the event of his 
default. The last payment became delinquent and there was due 
interest and certain taxes which were required to be paid by the 
buyer. On May 2, 1932, the seller notified ,the buyer in writing 
that unless the amounts due were paid on or before May 12, 
1932, the seller "will elect and does hereby elect to declare 
a forfeiture and cancellation of said contract and of all your 
rights thereunder." May 12th passed, however, without either 
party taking any steps to protect his interests and there was 
no deed tendered from the seller to the buyer on :May 12th 
or at any time prior to August S, 1932, a which time the 
seller tendered a deed and demanded payment of the contract. 
Nothing was done at that time and the present action was 
instituted several days later. 
The Court held that the seller having made no tender of 
a deed concurrent with or in connection with the notice of 
.May 2, 1932, he was in no position to complain that the buyer 
was in default. The Court held that since the conditions of 
the contract were concurrent, the buyer could not be placed 
in default without the seller tendering performance. The 
Court stated: 
"It is well settled, of course, that under such con-
ditions, when all payments have matured, the t'endor 
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is under the duty of tendering a deed, or performance 
uu bis part, before tbe vendee can be put in default. 
Stein v. Waddell, 37 Wash. 634, 80 P. 184;. Brugge· 
mann v. Converse, 47 Wash. 581, 92 P. 429; Tacoma 
\\'ater Supply Co. v. Dumermuth, 51 Wash. 609, 99 
P. 74i; Christy v. Baiocchi, 5} Wash. 644, 102 P. 
752; Reese v. Westfield, 56 Wash. 415, 105 P. 837, 28 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 956; Gottschalk v. Meisenheimer, 62 
\Vash. 299, 113 P. 765, 115 P. 79; Gibson v. Rouse, 
81 Wash. 102. 142 P. 464. 
"Consequently, it follows that the so-called notice 
of forfeiture served on May 2, 1932, without the tender 
of a deed by the vendor at the time fixed therein for 
the payment, became ineffectual as a notice of for-
feiture and ineffectual for any purpose unless acted 
upon in some way by one or the other of the parties 
to be affected thereby." (Italics ours) . 
The Court then held that the subsequent action taken on 
August 5, 1932, by the seller was not effective. The Court said 
further: 
"It would seem, therefore, that the notice of May 2, 
1932, was wholly abortive, that the contract was left 
in full force and effect, that the vendee might ·there-
after at any time have cured its default by tendering 
payment, and that the vendor might thereafter at any 
time proceed to put the vendee in default by tender-
ing a deed and demanding the payments which wer~ 
overdue." 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held in 
C;·im et ux. v. JV atson, et al., 82 Pac. (2d) 172 ( 1938) that: 
"The rule simply is that, after final payment is due 
upon a time contract for the sale of land, neither party 
can put the other in default without tender of perform-
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ance. 2 Warvelle on Vendors (2d ed.), Sees. 756, 816, 
841; Stein v. Waddell, 37 Wash, 634, 80 P. 184; Davis 
v. Downie Investment Co., 179 Wash. 4 70, 38 Pac. 
(2d) 215. In the former case, the statement of the 
rule contained in Frink v. Thomas, 20 Or. 265, 25 P. 
717, 12 L.R.A. 239, was approved (page 186): 
" 'As a general rule, a party who asks for the rescis-
sion of a contract for the sale of real estate must be 
himself without fault; and when, as in this case, the 
payment of the purchase money and the making or 
tender of the deed are to occur simultaneously, they 
are regarded as mutual and concurrent acts, wbicb 
disable either party from putting an end to the contract, 
without performance or a valid offer to perform on 
his part; and, so far as the question of time is con-
cerned, both parties, after the· day provided for the 
consummation, may be considered equally in defa!!lt, 
and neither can hold himself dischm·ged from the 
obligation of complete performance until be ha.r ten-
dered performance on his own side, and demanded it 
on the other.' " 
See also Hamlin v. Berry, Sup. Ct. of Wash. 1938, 82 
Pac. (2d) 549. 
The same rule is applied on Grimes et al. v. Steele et ai., 
Dist. Ct. of App. 3rd Dist. (Cal.), 1943, 133 Pac. (2d) 874. 
The Court there stated: 
"It is well settled in this state that if a vendor al-
lows the whole of the purchase price to become due 
the payment of the price and the tender of a deed then 
become dependent and concurrent conditions, and 
nonpayment alone does not put the vendee in default. 
The vendor must tender a deed as a condition to de-
manding payment of the price, and he cannot, withm~t 
such tender, declare a forfeiture, or maintain a smt 
·10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
either for the whole price, or for an intermediate in-
stallment. Kerr v. Reed, 187 Cal. 409, 202 P. 142; 
Lemle v. Barry, un Cal. 6, 183 P. 148; Hoppin v. 
:Munsey, 185 Cal. 678, 198 P. 398; Boone v. Temple-
man, supra; Caspar Lumber Co. v. Stowell, 37 Cal. App. 
2d 58,98 P. 2d 744; Ross v. McDougal, 31 Cal. App. 
2d 114, 87 P. 2d 709; ~lonnette v. Title Guar. & T. 
Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 428, 86 P. 2d 848. The same rule 
has been applied where the vendor seeks to quiet title. 
Sausalito Bay Land Co. v. Sausalito Imp. Co., 166 Cal. 
3<>2, 136 P. 57." 
And in Community Industrial Land Co. v. Walker, Dist. 
Ct. of Appeals 4th Dist. of Cal. ( 1943), 142 Pac. (2d) 757, 
the Court said at Page 759 Pac. Rep.: 
"It was held in Boone v. Templeman, 158 Cal. 290, 
110 P. 947, 139 Am. St. Rep. 126, that where such a 
contract makes the purchase price payable in install-
ments and the deed is to be made when the whole is 
paid, and where the vendor allows the full purchase 
price to become due, the payment of the purchase price 
becomes a dependent and concurrent condition with 
the giving of a deed and the vendor must tender a 
deed as a condition to declaring a forfeiture or to 
maintaining a suit for the purchase price. That rule 
has been followed in many cases since that time. In 
McCartney v. Campbell, 216 Cal. 715, 16 P. 2d 729, 
this rule was applied and it was held that where the 
vendor had still recognized the contract as in existence 
after a default in making payments he had no right to 
commence a quiet title action without a prior demand 
of performance or a tender of a deed. In a number of 
cases it has been held that where all of the installments 
were past due a vendor could not maintain a quiet 
title action until he had tendered a deed. Bank of 
America v.Ries, 128 Cal. App. 75, 16 P. 2d 1018; 
Ohanian v. Kazarian, 123 Cap. App. 196, 11 P. 2d 42; 
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t 
Caspar Lumber Co. v. Stowell, 37 Cal. App. 2d 58, 
98 P. 2d 744; Ross vs .. McDougal, 31 Cal. App. 2d 114, 
87 P. 2d 709." 
The following cases also support the rule: 
Walker lnv. Co. v. Fleming, Sup. Ct. Colo. 1926, 246 
Pac. 207. 
Giffen et ux. v. Faulkner, et al., Sup. Ct. Ida. 1930, 294 
Pac. 521. 
Klapka v. Shrauger, Sup. Ct. Neb. 1938, 281 N. \V. 
612. 
i\1ercer v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 188 S. W. 
(2d) 489 300 Ky. 311. 
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence that 
the defendants ever tendered a deed to plaintiffs or that they 
ever furnished an abstract of title or title insurance for exami-
nation at the time of the abortive effort to place plaintiffs in 
default. Insofar as the Trial Court found to the contrary in 
Findings of Fact 14, 16 and elsewhere, the said Findings are 
absolutely unsuppo.rted by the evidence in the case. Clearly 
Conclusion of Law No. 6 by the Court and the Decree based 
thereon are absolutely contrary to law and are ·unsupported 
by the Findings of Fact. 
The reason for the application of the rule is particularly 
apparent in this case. At the time of the conversation between 
l\1r. and Mrs. White and Mr. Loveland and Mr. Abraham 
Sieverts, Jr., on the telephone on August 7, 1952, reference 
was made to the fact that the abstract was not brought to 
date and that there was a portion of the property on which 
there was no abstract of title insurance policy had been ten· 
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dered. Unquestionably and explicitly, the obligation to obtain 
an abstract of title insurance policy was upon the seller. The 
seller cannot escape this obligation by the lame excuse that 
they thought that ~~ r. Loveland was going to take care of those 
matters. 
The sellers here are attempting to deprive plaintiffs of 
their equitable interest in real property. They must themselves 
have performed their obligation before they are in any position 
to complain of plaintiffs' alleged non-performance. They 
themselves must have as strictly complied with the nice re-
quirements of the law of tender as the demands they make upon 
plaintiffs. Clearly the notice of July 19th contains no tender 
of deeds or abstracts. Certainly defendants cannot say that 
they tendered an abstract, title insurance or a warranty deed 
over the telephone, particularly when it is absolutely dear 
that they never executed a deed to the property to plaintiffs, 
never had a title insurance policy and apparently didn't know 
whether they had an abstract. 
On the other hand, the evidence indicates that defendants 
agreed that they would come into the office of plaintiffs to 
execute the deed, to obtain the payment due, and to deliver 
proper abstracts of title or insurance upon the property. 
It is submitted that the action of the Trial Court in per-
mitting defendants to hold plaintiffs in default on this contract, 
when defendants themselves tendered no performance re-
quired, is inequitable, grossly unfair and is expressly contrary 
to the rulings of the cases herein cited. 
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POINT IV 
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE NOT SUPPORT-
ED BY THE FINDINGS, AND THE DECREE IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND/OR 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
As more particularly specified in the first three points of 
this brief, the Findings are inadequate, incomplete and equi-
Yocal. They do not support the Conclusions of Law and Decree, 
and the Trial Court incorrectly applied the law to the facts 
of the case. 
The Court should determine that plaintiffs were never 
in default of the oral modification of the contract; that de-
fendants made no objection to plaintiffs' tender at the time 
the contract was made, and that defendants made no valid 
tender of a deed or of the provisions of the contract requiring 
marketable title, an abstract of title and/ or title insurance 
on the property. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submittecl 
that the judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed; that 
a decree should be entered in accordance with the demands 
of plaintiffs' complaint requiring specific performance of the 
contract, and awarding to plaintiffs' attorneys fees, damages 
and costs in such amount as the Court may determine. 
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN 
and RICHARDS, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
App!dlants 
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